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The interwar period was marked by the end of the classical gold standard regime and new levels 
of macroeconomic disorder in the world economy. The interwar disorder often is linked to 
policies inconsistent with the constraint of the open-economy trilemma—the inability of 
policymakers simultaneously to pursue a fixed exchange rate, open capital markets, and 
autonomous monetary policy. The first two objectives were linchpins of the pre-1914 order. As 
increasingly democratic polities faced pressures to engage in domestic macroeconomic 
management, however, either currency pegs or freedom of capital movements had to yield. This 
historical analytic narrative is compelling—with significant ramifications for today’s world, if 
true—but empirically controversial. We apply theory and empirics to the interwar data and find 
strong support for the logic of the trilemma. Thus, an inability to pursue consistent policies in a 
rapidly changing political and economic environment appears central to an understanding of the 




In  the  present  era  of  globalization,  one  of  the  most  difficult  challenges  for
governments—and for those who advise them—is to understand the constraints under
which policies must be designed in a world of increasing economic interdependence.
Nowhere are these constraints more pressing than in the arena of monetary policy design
in open economies, where the recent spate of economic crises in developing countries,
from Mexico in 1994 to East Asia in 1997 to Argentina in 2001, highlighted the costs to
be paid when the exchange rate regime unravels. In this paper we place the current
quandary in a longer run context, and ask what lessons history has for contemporary
problems. Our approach brings together theory, empirics, and history.
The theoretical foundation of this paper casts the choices faced by policymakers in
terms of the classic macroeconomic trilemma: the idea that of the three policy objectives
of a fixed exchange rate, open capital markets, and autonomous monetary policy; only
two can be mutually consistent and, hence, tenable as stable features of the policy regime.
The intuition is simple: when a country credibly and permanently pegs its exchange rate
to some base country, and when capital is freely mobile, simple interest parity pins down
the domestic interest rate, forcing it to be equal to the interest rate in the base country. We
do not study what might be driving the intent of the authorities to manipulate nominal
interest rates in the short run, but we take as given their desire to engage in active
macroeconomic management over the business cycle and their belief that, due to short-
run nominal rigidities, such intervention might be effective.
We will also take it as given—even uncontroversial—that the defining role of a
sovereign monetary authority is that it will exercise such powers, when feasible and
desirable, and this will affect liquidity, and hence interest rates, at the short end of the
market. Some deeper questions intrude, however, especially with regard to feasibility and
desirability. On feasibility, in contrast to the stark prescriptions of the trilemma, we know
that intervention can be more continuous than dichotomous, sometimes as a result of
authorities’ decisions not to peg to a fixed rate, but instead to limit exchange rate
movements to a band or “target zone.” As has been recognized in the literature at least
since the writings of Goschen (1861), this can leave some wiggle room for monetary
policy—but how much? On desirability, we also have to be careful about the intent (or
objectives) of policymakers, versus their constraints (or choice set). Under some policy
systems, such as the gold standard, intent was not really a matter of debate in theory,
although economic historians have noted that substantial deviations were witnessed in
practice (Bloomfield, 1959; and Scammell, 1965). Under alternative systems, such as
inflation targeting or other nominal anchors, authorities may have varying degrees of
freedom depending on the regime in place, and depending on the regime of the partner
country. Thus convergence, or divergence, from international monetary regimes or
operating rules—a function of history, politics, and ideology—may lead to greater or
lesser degrees of synchronization in policymakers’ actions.2
Our approach to these difficulties is to develop a formal model as a benchmark to
guide our interpretation of the empirical findings. Using a target-zone model, one can
compute the extent to which policymakers create a divergence between short-term
domestic  and  base-country  interest  rates  under  various  policy  scenarios.  Different
parameterizations allow such a model to capture both tight pegs (a narrow band) and
nonpegs (an infinite band width), as well as varying degrees of activism on the part of
policymakers as they seek to smooth out, or reinforce, monetary shocks from abroad.
The goal of the subsequent empirical work is to measure the extent to which changes
in the relevant foreign “base” nominal interest rate pass through into the domestic
nominal interest rate. The data provide some challenges. Sometimes care is needed to
ensure that the correct base country is chosen, because at certain times in history this
choice is not necessarily obvious. Furthermore, the status of a country with respect to the
fixity of its exchange rate against any base currency is not always clear. Another
difficulty arises from the near-nonstationarity of nominal interest rates in many historical
periods. That feature of the data narrows our choice of techniques for both time series and
panel estimation. With these problems addressed, however, the empirical method allows
us to concentrate on the central predictions of the trilemma. To what extent do countries
that peg and have open capital markets lose their monetary sovereignty? And do they
recoup it when they resolve the trilemma in other ways—either by allowing the exchange
rate to float, or by imposing capital controls? By dividing our sample according to
exchange rate regime and capital control criteria, we can examine these questions.
The trilemma is not necessarily an easy proposition to test, but we view our approach
as one of the more direct ways to explore its validity. Previous empirical tests of the
trilemma have produced mixed results. Often the test has been indirect, as with the
literature on the so-called “exchange rate disconnect” (Baxter and Stockman, 1989; and
Flood  and  Rose,  1995).  These  authors  saw  very  little  difference  in  the  statistical
properties of real and nominal economic fluctuations in fixed versus floating rate
episodes, except for the volatility and comovement of real and nominal exchange rates.
As a corollary it could be inferred that the trilemma tradeoffs might not impinge so
tightly.  Yet  such  an  inference  would  clearly  depend  on  additional  maintained
assumptions, in particular about the horizon over which autonomy can be presumed to
have an effect. Further, since the data used for these analyses was of low frequency, it
could very well understate the ability of monetary authorities to exert some high-
frequency autonomy, even if they are subject to other constraints, such as real interest rate
equality, at longer horizons.
1
A more direct approach to testing the trilemma was taken by Rose (1996) who
compared the predictions of a monetary model of exchange rates, based on money
                                                            
1 Indeed, the one “robust result” cited by Flood and Rose is a negative relationship
between exchange rate and output variability (Flood and Rose, 1995, p. 18). That pattern
is consistent with a role for exchange rate flexibility in dampening output fluctuations.3
aggregates and outputs, with actual exchange rate movements, conditional on capital
controls and the exchange rate regime. His results were somewhat consistent with the
trilemma, but still weak. It could be argued that one source of weakness was the use of the
monetary model, which seems to perform poorly at higher frequencies, due to unstable
money demand, and which is therefore unable cleanly to capture the high frequency
content of the trilemma. A natural alternative is to measure monetary policy not by a
quantity, money stocks, but by a price, namely the actual instrument used by most central
banks to impose their policy—the short-term interest rate. Ours is one of several recent
studies to follow this tack (Frankel, Schmukler, and Servén, 2002; Obstfeld, Shambaugh,
and Taylor, 2004; and Shambaugh, 2004).
We choose to bring these theoretical and empirical tools to bear on one of the most
turbulent periods in the history of the international macroeconomy—the interwar period.
In the next section we explore the history of that period, where the narratives tell of a
crisis in which the implications of the trilemma were suddenly more apparent than ever
before. Subsequent sections discuss our theoretical simulations, describe the data we
employ, and present the empirical results. A concluding section sums up the lessons
learned and their relevance today.
I. Trilemma in the Interwar Period
After introducing our footholds in theory and empirics, we now turn to history and the
interwar period, which is the object of study in this paper. The period’s relevance is clear:
arguably it was in this epoch that the trilemma forcefully made its presence felt for the
first time in the great debate over the political economy of macroeconomics. For that
reason, the trilemma idea resonates strongly with economic historians, who tend to
understand the evolution of the global macroeconomic order in those terms. In the
interwar period, all the key ingredients of the trilemma came into collision (Eichengreen,
1996; and Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998, 2004).
In 1913, the ideology of the classical gold standard still held sway, and international
capital market integration had reached its zenith, leaving the authorities with little room
for maneuver. The rise of more democratic polities led policymakers to seek greater
autonomy than the old “rules of the game” permitted. Conventional wisdom argues that
such a combination of inconsistent elements set the gold standard up for its swift demise
following a brief reconstruction in the 1920s, a key part of the wider collapse of
globalization seen during the interwar years (Temin, 1989; and James, 2001). Some have
further  argued  that  this  crisis  reflected  a  fundamental  conflict  between  economic
globalization, or at least its macroeconomic manifestation in the gold standard, and the
advance of democracy, a tension that would perhaps henceforth place limits on the role of
markets  under  the  modern  nation-state,  although  the  recent  so-called  return  to
globalization has seemingly reversed that trend (Polanyi, 1944; Yergin and Stanislaw,4
1998; Lindsey, 2002; and Tortella, 2003). This is the history, therefore, not of a far-
removed past but a close precursor of the present, and the same trilemma clearly has
relevance for the choices facing policymakers today. Once again, capital markets are
increasingly fluid, an air of experimentation surrounds exchange rate regime choice, and
the loss of monetary sovereignty is an issue of burning interest, especially to emerging-
market countries.
Thus, the interwar period stands as a defining moment in the history of modern
political economy and macroeconomics, and the trilemma was the issue at the very center
of events. The historical record provides plenty of examples and anecdotes consistent
with this story. Witness the heated debate over gold resumption at par in Britain, pitting
Keynes  against  conventional  opinion,  as  general  labor  unrest  simmered  in  the
background; or, under conditions of equal or greater social foment, consider the tortured
compromises by French politicians in the run up to Poincaré’s resumption at a devalued
parity, and the continuing policy uncertainty as France clung to gold until 1936. Yet,
despite all of this suggestive evidence, we are unaware of any research that formally and
directly  tests  for  the  presence  of  the  trilemma,  and  examines  its  potency,  in  the
macroeconomic crucible of the interwar years.
Unfortunately, this is to some degree understandable given the chaotic nature of the
period. Serious empirical work of the kind we envisage requires high-frequency data
collection for interest rates and clear records of the capital control and exchange rate
regimes for each country. The task is daunting for the years between the wars, as data can
be collected only with difficulty and with substantial noise. Regime definition is often
imprecise and certainly volatile. Many countries changed their peg and capital control
status several times. Some countries were off gold but really “shadowing” the gold
standard in a desperate attempt eventually to rejoin. Capital control policies varied by
country in their degree of strictness. Our own work has previously examined the trilemma
empirically in the pre-1914 and post-1945 periods, where the empirical challenges are
somewhat fewer (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor, 2004). We have since, however,
constructed an interwar database that allows us to put the trilemma to the test at perhaps
its most critical historical moment.
Looking on the bright side, the extreme variation in conditions during the interwar
sample period is, of course, good news from the econometric standpoint. Whereas our
previous  work  compared  economic  experiences  separated  by  many  decades,  and
sometimes a century or more, the interwar period supplies all the variation we could hope
for in the space of ten or fifteen years. In that brief window, fixes and floats, controls and
free markets were all tried here and there. We therefore find ample power to identify the
effects we study, although sometimes the extremely short duration of peg and float
episodes makes univariate time-series analysis difficult. The interwar period also follows
hard  on  the  heels  of  an  ideal  benchmark  era  against  which  we  can  compare  our
results—the classical pre-1914 gold standard. Accordingly, we shall refer back to results5
for that period as a basis for judging the behavior of the interwar regimes. Along the way,
we also gain an opportunity to consider some related hypotheses, for example, the much-
discussed switch of the world financial center from London to New York after World War
I, considered essential to the hegemony theory of an evolution from a British- to a U.S.-
led world order (Kindleberger, 1986).
The central aim, however, is to test the power of the trilemma as an explanatory tool.
To  lay  the  groundwork  for  that  test,  we  now  turn  to  some  important  theoretical
considerations that help buttress our econometric approach and subsequent interpretations
of the results.
II. Empirical Methodology and Rationale
The starting point for our econometric analysis is a panel regression of the form
DRit = β DRbit + uit, (1)
where Rit is the nominal interest rate in country i on date t, Rbit is the interest rate in the
“base” country, and uit is a random shock.
2 Under perfect international capital mobility
and an exchange rate credibly pegged with a zero fluctuation band, we would expect to
find ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of 
€ 
ˆ  β =1 and R2=1. In practice, however, the
actual estimates differ from this hypothetical benchmark case, and we wish to know if
there are systematic differences in the size of 
€ 
ˆ  β  between pegged exchange rate regimes
and nonpegs. Our claim is that such divergences inform us about the scope for interest
rate management, and therefore for monetary policy independence, under alternative
exchange rate regimes. As an alternative way to measure the impact of a peg on the
sensitivity of domestic to foreign interest rates, we pool data from peg and nonpeg
regimes and look at the magnitude of 
€ 
ˆ  β  2 in the regression
DRit = β1 DRbit + β2 (DRbit  × PEGit) + uit, (2)
where PEGit takes the value 1 if country i pegs to the base currency at time t and 0
otherwise.
We focus our theoretical discussion on the key slope coefficient β in equation (1),
though we also consider the fit of that equation in our empirical results. A convenient
                                                            
2 Variants of this methodology are followed also the precursor papers by Frankel,
Schmukler, and Servén (2002), Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2004), and Shambaugh
(2004).  We  omit  fixed  effects  from  the  preceding  equation  on  the  grounds  that
deterministic trends in nominal interest rates are implausible; and, in practice, when we
include such fixed effects they are estimated to be indistinguishable from zero.6
starting point for interpreting estimates of equation (1) is the generalized uncovered
interest parity relationship
R = Rb + ε + v, (3)
where ε  is the expected depreciation rate of the domestic currency (over a horizon
corresponding to that of the interest rates R and Rb) and v is a random, mean-zero, excess
return or risk premium that, for convenience, we take to be exogenous. Given the model
of equation (3), the OLS estimate of β in the difference regression (1) satisfies
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where ρ is a correlation coefficient, σ is a standard deviation, and T is sample size. The
second term on the right-hand side above captures the average response of exchange rate
expectations to changes in the base interest rate. Under interest parity, if a rise in the
foreign base interest rate is accompanied by a smaller absolute rise in the domestic
interest—as would be the case under a system of domestic interest rate smoothing by the
monetary  authority—then  the  expected  rate  of  currency  depreciation,  ε,  must
simultaneously fall. This could be accomplished by allowing the domestic currency to
depreciate sufficiently in the foreign exchange market to induce a higher expected rate of
future appreciation (that is, a lower expected rate of future depreciation). In that case, the
average Σt(Dεt DRbt)/T is negative for large enough T, as is the correlation coefficient
ρ(Dεt,DRbt), and 
€ 
ˆ  β  < 1. Alternatively, were the home monetary authority to reinforce the
effect of foreign interest shocks, one would expect 
€ 
ˆ  β  > 1. Thus, the coefficient β
measures the extent to which domestic monetary policy has (and uses) the scope to
respond to foreign interest rate shocks.
An alternative specification would be the analog of equation (1) in interest rate levels
rather than differences,
Rit = α + β Rbit + ηit. (5)
Such a strategy seems inadvisable in light of the persistence of nominal interest rates in
our data. For the interwar period, the monthly series of U.S. interest rates displays an
autocorrelation coefficient of 0.99 in monthly data, and for the vast majority of other7
interest rates in our sample the presence of a unit root cannot be rejected statistically.
3
Thus, the assumption of a unit root in interest rates is a good approximation to the data.
Under a unit root, however, estimation in levels of interest rates yields
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assuming the expected depreciation rate is statistically stationary. Because the stochastic
trends in the interest rates dominate, levels estimates are not well suited to yield
information about interest rate independence. If international interest rates are not
cointegrated, the spurious regression problem stressed by Shambaugh (2004) can arise. In
the data, we find that the residual terms in equation (1) are approximately serially
uncorrelated.
To evaluate these claims, as well as to aid in interpreting the empirical results, we
perform Monte Carlo experiments using simulated data based on a formal model of
exchange rate target zones. The basic model comes from Krugman (1991) and has been
extended by Flood and Garber (1991), Froot and Obstfeld (1991), Svensson (1991), and
others. To generate interest rates of noninstantaneous maturity, we utilize Svensson’s
(1991) account of the term structure of interest rates within a target zone. We compare the
results of interest rate regressions under a narrow target zone (bands of ±1 percent) and a
freely floating exchange rate.
It is helpful to give a brief description of the model that we use in these simulations.
4
The time-t log exchange rate, e(t), is defined as the home price of foreign currency. It is






where x(t) is a “fundamental” economic variable driving currency value (for example, the
home less the foreign money supply) and η  > 0. The fundamental x follows a mean
reverting process of form
€ 
dx = −ξxdt +σ dz, (6)
                                                            
3 In contrast, under the pre-1914 gold standard, nominal interest rates appear stationary.
Apparent nonstationarity is the rule after World War II, as during the interwar period.
4 A more detailed description of the model and methodology can be found in Obstfeld,
Shambaugh, and Taylor (2004).8
where dz is Gaussian noise.
5 Under these assumptions, and an allowable (reflecting)
fluctuation band 
€ 
[e,e ] for the exchange rate, there is a unique price solution e = s(x), from








′  ′  s (x),
follows from Itô’s Lemma.
6
The preceding equation defines an instantaneous expected depreciation rate. The
interest  rates  available  for  empirical  analysis  apply,  however,  to  finite  maturities.
Svensson  (1991)  shows  that  when  uncovered  interest  rate  parity  holds,  we  can






where f(m,x) is the exchange rate expected to prevail after an interval of positive length m
has elapsed.
7 We specify the base foreign interest rate 
€ 
Rb
mof the relevant maturity to
follow a random walk, constrained only by a lower bound of zero. In line with equation
(3), which incorporates a deviation v from interest parity, the domestic nominal interest





We interpret the error v as an empirical, serially uncorrelated and exogenous departure
from the underlying economic model. Svensson (1991) shows how to solve for the term




 has a lower bound of zero. We
further constrain the noise v to preclude pure arbitrage profits in the target zone case (that
is, we rule out interest differentials larger than the maximum capital loss allowed by the
                                                            
5 In Krugman’s (1991) original model, ξ = 0. Under that assumption, however, exchange
rates would follow a random walk under a free float, minimizing international interest
differentials. To get a better sense for the scope for interest rate independence under a
float, we therefore consider the case ξ > 0 in our simulations, following Froot and
Obstfeld (1991).
6 The exchange rate solution under a free float, such that 
€ 




7 Of course, f(0,x) = s(x). Think of m as a fraction of a year.9
bands). That further constraint is necessary when the bands are permanent and fully
credible, as we are assuming.
In practice we approximate equation (6) by a discrete-time process sampled at
intervals of h = 10 minutes. The base interest rate’s level is generated as a random walk
modified by a nonnegativity constraint. Innovations in the base interest rate and the
domestic fundamentals are drawn form a bivariate normal distribution. A key parameter
in the simulated data is ρ(Dz,DRb), defined as the instantaneous correlation between the
innovation in the base interest rate Rbi,t
m – Rbi,t–h
m and the innovation in fundamentals, zt –
zt–h. To interpret ρ(Dz,DRb), think again of zt – zt–h as the innovation in the home less
foreign money supply (in logs). In that case, a positive ρ(Dz,DRb) signifies a tendency for
domestic money to increase relative to foreign money when the foreign interest rate rises,
an outcome that would dampen the response of the home to the foreign interest rate. In
contrast, when ρ(Dz,DRb) = 0 that response is one-for-one, whereas for ρ(Dz,DRb) < 0,
instead of interest rate smoothing by the domestic central bank, we have the opposite:
policy action to reinforce the domestic impact of the foreign interest rate movement.
Because expected depreciation ε is decreasing in the fundamental x,
8 the correlation
coefficient ρ(Dε,DRb) in equation (4) is an inverse function of ρ(Dz,DRb). As a result,
setting ρ(Dz,DRb)  > 0  results  in  ρ(Dε,DRb)  < 0  and,  by  equation  (4),  in 
€ 
ˆ  β   <  1.
Conversely, setting ρ(Dz,DRb) < 0 yields 
€ 
ˆ  β  > 1.
Table 1 shows the mean estimates and dispersion based on 1,000 replications of a 30-
year history. We consider both a target zone with quite narrow bands (±1 percent, that is,
€ 
[e,e ] = [–0.01,0.01]) and a floating regime.
9 The simulation analysis produces three-
month rates of interest under alternative policy settings of ρ(Dz,DRb) = 0.8, 0.5, 0, and
–0.5.
10
                                                            
8 The validity of the last claim follows from both the mean reversion in the fundamentals
process and the curvature of the exchange rate solution function, s(x).
9 We note that a target-zone width of ±1 percent corresponds to the Bretton Woods
fluctuation bands against the U.S. dollar, and is considerably narrower than the bands that
have characterized the European Exchange Rate Mechanisms. A band width of ±1 percent
also is not far off estimates of the target zone induced by gold points prior to 1914.
10 Table 1 reports results for three-month rates because that maturity is typical in our
empirical analysis. We examined overnight rates in simulations that are not reported here.
At that maturity the international linkage is somewhat weaker, as one would expect,
although the differences from the numbers in Table 1 are not huge. For the simulations,
we calibrate the annual standard deviation of the innovation in 
€ 
Rb
m to that in the annual
average end-of-month Federal funds rate (1975–2001). We calibrate the annual standard
deviation of the innovation in fundamentals, x, to that in the annual average end-of-month
dollar-mark (starting in 1999, dollar-euro) exchange rate (1975–2001). Finally, we take
the standard deviation in the exogenous noise v to be 20 basis points for interest rates
expressed on an annual basis. The behavioral parameter η, the implicit (absolute) interest
semi-elasticity of money demand, is set to 4. At a nominal interest rate of 5 percent per10
For policy regimes ranging from ρ(Dz,DRb) = 0.5 (partial interest rate smoothing) to
ρ(Dz,DRb) = 0.8 (more aggressive interest rate smoothing), Table 1 shows that the mean
slope estimate 
€ 
ˆ  β DIFFS from the differences specification, equation (1), is in a range of 0.7
to 0.5. An intermediate figure is 0.6—far below unity despite the rather narrow target
zone. In the corresponding floating-rate regimes, 
€ 
ˆ  β DIFFS is considerably below its value in
the target-zone cases, suggesting substantially more interest rate independence at the short
end. For ρ(Dz,DRb) = 0.8 the mean estimate is only 0.16. Nonetheless, for ρ(Dz,DRb) =
0.5, the mean estimate of 
€ 
ˆ  β DIFFS = 0.46 under a float remains sizable. As expected, the
average measure of fit, R2
DIFFS, also varies across regimes with target zones generating a
range of 0.13 to 0.20 and floats 0.02 to 0.05. The fact that these are so far from the
predicted value of 1 if there is no smoothing provides important context for the empirical
results.
When ρ(Dz,DRb) = 0, meaning that interest rates are not smoothed at all, the estimate
of 
€ 
ˆ  β DIFFS ≈ 1 reflects that domestic interest rates now are moving basically in tandem with
the base rate, under both the target zone and the float. For ρ(Dz,DRb) = –0.5, 
€ 
ˆ  β DIFFS
exceeds 1 because foreign interest rate movements are reinforced, not offset, by domestic
policy. The effect is stronger under a float than under a target zone. Under a float, the
effects of fundamentals on the exchange rate, and hence, the interest rate responses, are
not muted by expected intervention at the band edges.
The results of estimating the levels specification, equation (5), are reported in the
column of Table 1 labeled 
€ 
ˆ  β LEVELS. These results are as expected when the base interest
rate, Rbit, has a unit root. The levels estimates 
€ 
ˆ  β LEVELS are much closer to unity than
€ 
ˆ  β DIFFS under all policy settings, and as a result, the estimated differences between the
target zone and the float are much less evident than in the less compressed differences
estimates. We have experimented with simulated sample periods out to 100 years and find
that while the differences estimates remain quite stable, the levels estimates (as one would
expect) move markedly in the direction of unity as the sample period is lengthened. The
levels estimates obscure the contrasts between regimes in finite samples, and will hide
them entirely as the time-series sample grows arbitrarily long. The values of R2
LEVELS are
high due to the common trend in foreign and domestic interest rates.
In practice we estimate equation (1) on a panel of annual year-average interest rate
changes, so as to minimize international asymmetries caused by different short-term
dynamic adjustment patterns to foreign interest rate changes. We pursue an additional
estimation strategy, however, that focuses directly on the dynamics of adjustment. If the
interest rate data are indeed statistically nonstationary, an error-correction specification
can be used to analyze the dynamics of monthly data. In practice one cannot be sure the
data are I(1) rather than I(0). To maintain an agnostic view on stationarity, we employ a
                                                                                                                                                                                     
year, the implied interest elasticity of money demand would be –0.2, the value cited by
Romer (2001, p. 470). We set ξ = 1.5.11
technique proposed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001), henceforth PSS, in which an
error-correction form is estimated but different critical values are applied to the I(1) and
I(0) cases.
11 Only when test statistics lie in an intermediate range must inference rely on
an assumption about the order of integration.
The PSS technique relies on the specification
DRit = α + β DRbit + θ(c + Rit–1 – γ Rbi,t–1) + uit, (7)
where lags of DRit and DRbit are included as necessary and γ is a cointegrating coefficient.
The significance and absolute magnitude of the coefficient θ, which we expect to be
negative, if local interest rates adjust back toward the base rate after a shock, reflect the
strength of the adjustment forces. In the monthly data we use, a coefficient of θ  = –0.5
would imply a half-life of one month. Other things equal, faster adjustment is an indicator
of a less autonomous monetary policy. For nonstationary data we would expect γ  = 1, in
which case one could impose that equality on the equation before estimating θ.
The final column of Table 1 reports mean simulated values of the estimate 
€ 
ˆ  θ  from
equation (7). The estimates average to around –0.2 under a target zone and about –0.1
under a float, with the result fairly insensitive to the extent of short-run interest rate
smoothing. The implied half-lives of shocks are under three months for a target zone but
roughly seven months for floats.
III. Data
Interest Rate Data
To test the trilemma’s predictions, we must describe the different policy options countries
are pursuing. As noted above, we view the short-term nominal interest rate as the
instrument of a country’s monetary policy and the extent of comovement of the local
nominal interest rate with a nominal base-country interest rate as an (inverse) expression
of monetary policy autonomy.
Our core data are all monthly. Short-term nominal interest rates for 16 countries in the
years 1919–38 come from Global Financial Data ((GFD), www.globalfindata.com). In
general these data were originally reported in League of Nations sources. The data are
listed as “bills” or “banker’s bills” (typically of three-months’ maturity). We add data for
Switzerland, available in the Federal Reserve’s Banking and Monetary Statistics (1943).
The League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks reported annual averages of monthly interest
rates for Chile and Denmark, and we use these data as well. All three added series are
market rates of discount. When available in both sources, the GFD interest rate series
match almost exactly the data for private discount rates listed in the Federal Reserve’s
                                                            
11 This technique is also used by Frankel, Schmukler, and Servén (2002).12
Banking and Monetary Statistics. As noted earlier, in the differences regressions, monthly
interest rates for a particular year are averaged to yield annual observations. Table 2 lists
the countries and data that are available.
All interest rates are expressed in the form ln(1 + R). While this transformation has a
trivial impact for moderate interest rates, it does shrink the impact of outliers. In addition,
the German hyperinflation is removed to prevent the massive interest rate swings during
that relatively short episode from overwhelming the rest of the data. Thus, observations
for Germany from 1923–25 are eliminated.
Because we are interested in comovements with the base interest rate, an important
choice  is  that  of  the  center-country  or  base  nominal  interest  rate.  Under  typical
post–World War II fixed exchange rate regimes, countries have pegged to other countries,
thereby revealing their particular bases. In theory, however, a multilateral gold standard
regime differs, in that monetary changes in any country affect the system as a whole, and
there is symmetric adjustment. More practically, however, one thinks of a de facto center
country, namely, Great Britain, even under the pre-1914 gold standard. In contrast to the
classical gold standard, though, there is no clear base country for the system as a whole
during the interwar years. While the United States returned fully to the gold standard
immediately after World War I, it is not clear that the United States was the sole base for
the system. Indeed, the U.S. dollar itself did not remain fixed against gold throughout the
entire era (Franklin Roosevelt devalued the dollar-gold exchange rate in 1933). Sterling
was not convertible into gold for much of the period; Britain remained on gold only for
about 77 months, so Britain is not an ideal base country either. France played a major role
in the setting of policies because of its successful attempt to amass large quantities of gold
reserves, but it did not repeg to gold on a de jure basis until 1928, two years after the
Poincaré macroeconomic stabilization, making it an inappropriate choice as a base
country early on in the time period that we study. Because the United States and France
held the majority of gold reserves, our default procedure is to use the U.S. interest rate for
the early and late periods, and a combination of U.S. and French rates for the years France
is on a de jure gold standard.
12 This base interest rate will be referred to below as the gold
interest rate.
13
Due to the lack of a clear center country, we consider a variety of base country interest
rates as robustness checks. We checked all cases using the U.S. interest rate alone, as well
as considering the British interest rate as the base rate, as a way of checking the
                                                            
12 Mouré (2002) discusses how many view France’s gold policies as having had a strong
impact on the system as a whole. This source also reports that France and the United
States had the two largest national gold reserves and that, combined, they held 50 to 60
percent of the world’s total stock of gold reserves.
13 For annual differences regressions, this is simply the average of the change in the U.S.
and French rates. For the levels analysis on monthly data, the U.S. rate is used up to 1928,
and then that rate is adjusted going forward by the average change in the U.S. and French
rates until 1936, after which it is adjusted by changes in the U.S. rate alone.13
assumption that Britain had ceased to be the center country. We also tried varying the
base by local country to allow for the fact that, especially after 1931, the system broke
down into smaller spheres of influence. We followed the coding that Eichengreen and
Irwin (1995) use to describe currency blocs, dividing countries into Sterling countries
(Denmark, India, Japan, and Sweden, using Britain as the base), Gold Bloc countries
(Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland, using France as the base), Reichsmark
countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, using Germany as
the base), and other countries (China and Chile, using the United States as base).
14 While
the cross-base comparisons are discussed below, we feel in general that the gold interest
rate is the most appropriate choice for the base rate.
Exchange Rate Regime Coding
The exchange rate regimes are classified both based on the legal commitment of countries
to gold (the de jure status) as well as the de facto behavior of the exchange rate. De jure
coding is based on the dates given by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). The de jure status is in
some sense a combination of the exchange rate regime and capital control regime sides of
the trilemma as countries are considered to be off gold if they restricted convertibility in
any way. The de facto standard follows the coding for the post–Bretton Woods era
developed in Shambaugh (2004). We ask whether the monthly exchange rate stayed
within ±2 percent bands over the course of a year. In addition, single realignments are not
considered breaks in the regime as long as the transition is immediate from one peg to
another. Finally, single-year pegs are dropped as they are quite likely a simple lack of
volatility and it is unlikely that there exists either commitment on the government’s part
or confidence in the market that the rate will not change.
15 We use the categories “peg”
and “nonpeg” to classify currency regimes so as to emphasize that countries without
pegged rates may not be “pure” floats in which exchange rate management is eschewed.
Countries with nonpegs simply do not peg completely (according to our metric).
Because there is no single base country to which countries peg, exchange rates are
tested for stability against gold by examining the exchange rate against the dollar during
the dollar’s peg to gold, and against the French franc in the two-year period (1933–34) of
                                                            
14 In addition, we tried both simply eliminating the base countries or including them using
the United States as the base rate for France, Germany, and Britain.
15 When pursuing differences regressions, we also drop the first year of a peg to avoid
differencing interest rates across nonpegged and pegged observations. Shambaugh (2004)
provides an extensive discussion of different de facto classifications. Recent work by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), which uses data on parallel exchange rates, is not directly
relevant to the present paper. Countries with parallel exchange markets employ capital
controls to separate commercial from financial transactions, and for that reason alone are
likely to enjoy some degree of monetary independence.14
dollar instability against gold. This provides a full series of codes for the countries that
stayed pegged to gold on a de facto basis.
16 Exchange rate data come from GFD.
Capital Control Status
To conduct our empirical analysis of the trilemma, we also need to code countries as to
their  use  of  capital  controls.  As  mentioned,  the  de  jure  exchange  rate  regimes
automatically incorporate this criterion. De facto capital control classifications have been
created for more recent eras, but most are available only for a limited number of countries
and a limited amount of time. Furthermore, some measures rely on interest differentials
(the variable upon which we focus) and thus are not appropriate for the present study. No
other clear source has been used to describe capital controls in this era before. We turn to
two sources to generate our own coding of capital controls. The League of Nations
publication Legislation on Gold (1930) gives a history of when countries returned to gold
convertibility, so we are able to code at what point after World War One countries opened
their capital markets to gold flows. In addition, the League of Nations’ Monetary Review
(1938) provides a table that describes when countries put in place exchange controls in
the 1930s (Appendix Table 1, p. 107). Combining these sources gives us our measure of
capital controls. Clearly, this binary measure is imperfect in capturing the range of
effectiveness that various controls may have had, but we feel that it provides a useful
indication of the countries trying to create breathing room by limiting cross-border
financial flows.
Individual Country Episodes
For the dynamic time-series analysis based on specification (7), we study monthly data on
individual country/regime episodes. Two types of episodes are examined. First we look at
the de jure coding, which gives us thirteen pegged episodes and 21 nonpegged episodes
(half of them occurring prior to the reconstituted gold standard, and half after). We also
use our exchange rate regime coding methodology to generate a monthly classification of
the currency regime in effect. We follow much the same method as for annual data,
checking that the exchange rate has stayed within ±2 percent bands over the preceding
twelve months. We then combine this information with our dates for capital controls to
generate four types of episode: open pegs, closed pegs, open nonpegs, and closed
nonpegs. Brief episodes of less than three years are excluded as too short to allow
informative time-series inference. There are eleven open pegs, three closed pegs, four
open nonpegs, and three closed nonpegs.
Unit Roots in Interest Rates
While the methodology section considers the fact that many time series of nominal
interest rate data are difficult to distinguish from unit roots, this is not necessarily true for
                                                            
16 As an alternative, we also looked at the years the League of Nations listed a country as
pegging to gold. The results are consistent with those reported below.15
the classical gold standard era. While showing persistence, the British interest rate, the
clear base rate under the classical gold standard, is relatively stable as are the interest rates
of most other gold standard countries. On the other hand, the interwar years appear to
resemble the Bretton Woods or post–Bretton Woods eras, in that the interest rates of most
countries show very strong serial correlation. Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c show the interest
rates for the United States, France, and the combined gold interest rate. For comparison,
Figure 1d shows Britain’s interest rate during the classical gold standard.
Simple tests on monthly base and local interest rates back up this ocular evidence that
interwar interest rates are highly persistent. The autocorrelation coefficient for the U.S.
rate is 0.99. The average autocorrelation coefficient for the other countries is 0.96. More
formally, we apply the unit root test suggested by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996),
using the modified Akaike Information Criterion of Ng and Perron (2001) to determine
the appropriate number of lags to include. In addition, we test for stationarity using the
KPSS test of Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shinn (1992), in which the null is
stationarity rather than nonstationarity. For twelve countries, we cannot reject a unit root,
but we can reject stationarity, implying that the interest rates are either nonstationary or
very close. For three countries the data reject a unit root and cannot reject stationarity,
while in one case the data can reject both, and in one case neither. As a general
conclusion, the very high persistence in the data suggests that inference will be more
reliable if they are treated as if they contain unit roots.
IV. Results
Results Based upon Pooled Differences
We begin by presenting results for the differences equation (1), based on the de facto
currency regime coding and using the gold interest rate as the base rate. Additional
specifications show results for alternative classifications and alternative base interest
rates.
The core empirical result of the paper is shown in Table 3, which reports estimates of
equation (1). The results are obtained by OLS, using robust standard errors clustered at
the country level. This procedure, along with the use of differenced data, removes
problems of both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity that could be present in the
panel. Also, because the data are in panel form, one may consider using fixed effects; but
as the data are differenced, a constant fixed effect would imply an implausible constant
rate of change over time. In any event, allowing for fixed effects has no impact on the
estimates in practice, and the estimated fixed effects are always zero.
17 Examining Table
                                                            
17 Observations for France are dropped for years in which its interest rate is a component
of the base interest rate. Dropping France altogether has no substantial impact on the16
3, we see a difference between the way pegged countries and those that are not pegged
react to the base interest rate. Countries, on average, move with the base interest rate to
some degree: β equals 0.30. However, pegs shadow the base rate much more closely than
nonpegs: β for pegs is 0.57 (0.13) versus 0.13 (0.18) for nonpegs. These results are quite
similar to the results for the classical gold standard, where the coefficient on pegs and
nonpegs are, respectively, 0.52 (0.04) and 0.05 (0.09) (see Table 4). The estimates also
are quite close to the earlier simulation results for the ρ(Dz,DRb) = 0.8 case (recall Table
1).
There is also a difference in the R2 for pegs and nonpegs during the interwar years, as
one would expect. The R2 for the pegged sample of 0.16 versus 0.01 for the nonpegs. This
difference matches the predictions of the trilemma, as the base country interest rate is a
more important factor determining the local country interest rate for pegs than for
nonpegs. Again, these differences in R2 are quite close to those in the simulation results.
While the coefficients are somewhat close in the two gold standard eras, there is a
clear difference in the explanatory power of the regressions. The difference in R2 across
pegs and nonpegs is far less striking than the classical gold standard (0.41 versus 0.00),
and is much closer to the results found in the post–Bretton Woods era (0.19 versus 0.01).
This difference is likely in part a result of the increasing use of capital account restrictions
in the interwar years, perhaps partly a result of the very large shocks hitting interwar
economies, and also possibly a result of countries’ taking more interest in using monetary
policy for domestic stabilization.
The results are further bolstered by looking at the alternative definitions of the gold
standard described earlier. The de jure classification, which essentially only codes
countries as pegged if the currency is fully convertible, shows stronger results. These pegs
are the countries operating under the full constraints of the trilemma, ones we would
expect to have very little autonomy. Here, the β coefficient for pegs is even larger than
during the classical gold standard [0.72 (0.14)], and the β  coefficient for nonpegs is
essentially zero [0.07 (0.18)]. The R2  on  the  pegged  group  also  goes  up  to  0.33,
suggesting that during the relatively well-functioning portion of the interwar gold
standard, gold adherence did operate as a strong constraint, nearly as strong as during the
classical period.
We also separate out the two legs of the trilemma, exchange rate regimes, and capital
controls, again using de facto exchange rate regimes, but now combined with our capital
control measure. As expected, the group of observations that represents pegs with open
capital markets shows the strongest connection to the base country (see Table 5). No other
group generates a β significantly different from zero or an R2 even half the size of the
open market pegs. The R2 suggests that over 20 percent of the movement in local interest
rates can be tied to the base rate. Thus, we see it is the combination of a fixed exchange
                                                                                                                                                                                     
results. The United States is dropped in all years, as its rate is always a component of the
base interest rate.17
rate and open capital markets that seems to generate the loss of autonomy. When
countries either float or close their capital markets, they cease to follow the base as
closely.
18
Our interpretation is not without caveats, however. We cannot state clearly that the
trilemma is forcing countries to follow the base because these results could be the
consequence of pegged countries simply choosing to follow the base or experiencing
shocks highly correlated with those hitting the base country. Previous work on the
post–Bretton Woods era assumes a variety of base interest rates in a given time period,
and thus allows the inclusion of time controls; distance and trade-share controls have been
included as well. The currency regime and capital control regime variables still show
strong impacts on the degree to which a country follows the base (Shambaugh, 2004).
Table 5 contains an apparent anomaly, though. The closed capital market nonpegs
should be the group with the greatest monetary freedom. While all groups except open
pegs should be able to pursue autonomous monetary policy to some degree, both
conventional wisdom and results from other eras (see Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor,
2004) would suggest that the closed market nonpegs should be least linked to the base.
There should be very little pressure on them to respond to the base interest rate, as they
should have achieved substantial autonomy both through shutting capital markets and by
not pegging. We find, though, that this group has a larger (though still statistically
insignificant) estimated β coefficient than do open nonpegs or closed pegs, and an R2 of
0.07. This pattern indicates a stronger connection for this group than for the closed pegs
or the open capital market nonpegs, and it is robust across a wide variety of base interest
rate definitions and regime classifications. We return to this curious finding when we
examine different time periods within the interwar sample.
We can further explore the results by pooling the data across regime and including an
interaction term for pegging times the change in the base interest rate (see equation (2)
above). The coefficient on peg times the change in the base rate is both large (0.43) and
statistically significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level (see Table 6, column
1). The coefficient is even larger under the de jure coding (0.62 (0.22)). This pooled
estimation procedure allows us to show that the results across samples are statistically
significant, though it removes the ability to test differences in the explanatory power of
the regression across subsamples. The procedure also summarizes the results in a more
compact manner, allowing us to display sensitivity across a variety of base interest rates.
                                                            
18  The  results  on  this  point  are  even  stronger  than  for  other  eras  (see  Obstfeld,
Shambaugh, and Taylor, 2004). A similar table, pooling data across the gold standard,
Bretton Woods and post–Bretton Woods eras, generates significant coefficients for both
pegs with capital controls and nonpegs without, though in both cases the coefficients are
smaller and the R
2
 much lower than for open pegs. In those results, it seems that either
closing capital markets or eliminating a peg restores some autonomy, but not as much as
doing both. In the interwar years, either action seems to restore autonomy.18
Results using the U.S. interest rate instead of the gold interest rate are similar on the
whole, but weaker. Results using the British interest rate are weaker still, with relatively
low and insignificant coefficients on the sterling interest rate alone or when interacted
with the peg dummy. Given the importance of France in the system and the fact that the
United States broke from gold at one point, it is not surprising that the gold interest rate
shows a stronger sway over pegged countries’ interest rates than does the dollar rate
alone. Likewise, given Britain’s relatively brief tenure in the interwar gold standard, it is
not surprising that the country does not appear to have provided a base interest rate for the
system. The weak international connections to Britain’s interest rate do, however, support
the view that after World War I, London was no longer the unrivaled center of global
financial power. This finding is therefore consistent with Kindleberger’s (1986) argument
that a shift in hegemonic financial power was in progress during the interwar years. The
regressions breaking the base interest rate into different rates for different countries are
reported in column 5 of Table 6. It seems that either the U.S. rate alone or the U.S.-French
rate in combination holds a much stronger sway over countries than the various bases that
may have been regional or historical leaders.
19 With each interest rate base, the divided
sample results (analogous to those in Table 3) yield a significant coefficient on the peg
sample and an insignificant one on the nonpeg sample. The coefficients on nonpegs are
sometimes estimated so imprecisely, however, that the differences across groups are not
statistically significant for every different base interest rate when the data are pooled.
Next, we may wonder whether the system behaved differently before and after its
descent into crisis. We use 1931 as the watershed year, as it featured the departure of
sterling from the system. We thus divide our sample into pre-1931 and post-1931. Table 7
shows that the pre-1931 results (the first three columns) look much like our results for the
overall sample, reported in the first table. Pegs generate higher coefficients and higher R2
than nonpegs and the predicted target zone coefficients in the neighborhood of 0.6 still
arise. On the other hand, the post-1931 results are radically different. Both pegs and
nonpegs show coefficients significantly different from zero and in fact greater than 1,
although we cannot reject that they are different from the frequently seen baseline
estimate of 0.6. In addition, the source of the anomaly in Table 5, which we discussed
earlier, comes to light. The closed capital market nonpegs show a coefficient significantly
different from zero, indeed well above 1, and an R2 exceeding 0.2. When splitting the data
into such narrow groups, we arrive at a small number of observations (35 in the case of
the closed nonpegs after 1931). Still, despite the small number of observations, this result
is statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
                                                            
19 Using the U.S. rate for the first half of the sample and the bloc-based interest rates after
Britain’s 1931 departure from gold yields even weaker results than in column 5 of Table
6. Thus, one cannot attribute the results to the fact that regionalization did not become
pronounced until the system started to break down.19
As for the question of why closed nonpegs would follow the base so closely, one may
hypothesize that the shock of the depression provoked similar responses in all countries,
and thus all countries show a strong correlation with the gold interest rate.
20 Alternatively,
one might think that the chaos of the era left countries desperate to cling to any anchor
they could find in order to restore stability. One strategy might have been to close off
capital markets to avoid further attacks while following the base interest rate zealously in
the hope of regenerating credibility. As it turns out, this latter explanation seems to have
some plausibility, as all the countries that are closed market nonpegs repeg relatively
quickly. Ten countries produce observations in this group, and all of them repeg before
the end of the sample. Thus, at least for some countries, the 1930s seem not so much an
era of pure monetary nationalism, as a time of desperate attempts to repeg. Table 8 shows
the countries in this group and the years they are considered closed nonpegs. None stays
nonpegged straight through to 1938; all restore a peg at some point. Many—for example,
Czechoslovakia—appear to be freer than they were in reality, as they peg briefly during
some of the years they are listed as nonpegs, but not consistently enough to be considered
a peg in those years. We return to these questions in the levels analysis.
Time-Series Levels Analysis
We can explore these issues further by examining individual country relationships with
the base interest rate. To do so we use the PSS methodology to test for the existence of
levels relationships between interest rates, simultaneously examining the dynamics of
adjustment.
Table 9 shows the individual results grouped by type of episode. The de jure results
have the advantage of only having to group countries by one measure. We examine three
groups, pegs, nonpegs before 1931, and nonpegs starting in 1931. It appears that the
relationship seen at the pooled panel level still holds at the individual level. By and large,
the pegs seem to follow the base rate (Table 9a shows the gold interest rate results). Six
out of the thirteen episodes are significant at both the I(1) and I(0) critical values, the
average cointegrating coefficient is 0.53 and the average half-life of adjustment is five
months. In addition, only one episode (Germany) has a backwards level relationship (that
is, γ < 0) and only one other (Italy) has a half-life of over twelve months. Nine out of the
thirteen have a levels relationship of the correct sign and half lives below six months.
Nonpegs do not show such a close relationship. Of the pre-1931 nonpegs, only one has
a levels relationship that is both significant and in the correct direction. The average
coefficient is –0.01, and the average adjustment half-life is 29 months. Also, two of the
                                                            
20 Results on individual countries, presented next, show that not all countries moved
together. That finding suggests that not all the results are due simply to common shocks.
The results are not driven strictly by the choice of a base country. Results for pre- and
post-1931 look broadly similar for the U.S. interest rate as a base. Using the British
interest rate as a base, though, shows very weak results, with pegs generating a coefficient
of 0.25 (0.11) versus 0.27 (0.16) for nonpegs.20
eight cases have backwards levels relationships and three more have adjustment half-lives
in excess of twelve months. Only China and the United Kingdom show much of a
connection to the base rate. Post-1930 nonpegs show almost no connection at all with the
gold interest rate. While two of the eleven have significant levels relationships in the
expected direction, eight of the eleven have levels relationships that imply they move
against the base country interest rate.
21
While the pre-1931 and peg results are broadly the same if one uses the U.S. interest
rate instead of the gold interest rate, the post-1930 nonpeg results look quite different
based on the U.S. interest rate.
22 Three of the eleven have a significant levels relationship
in the expected direction and another four have insignificant relationships in the expected
direction, with adjustment half-lives below seven months, leaving only four rates that run
opposite to the U.S. rate. This pattern suggests that by the end of the era, when the gold
standard had largely fallen apart, France’s role as a center country had diminished. As
discussed above, we are not surprised to see some of the de jure nonpegs follow the
United States from 1931 on. Many of these countries are in the process of reestablishing
their exchange rate pegs or at the very least are in desperate straits, struggling for some
credibility. On the other hand, some countries clearly are not following the United States,
so it seems that common global shocks are not the sole factor behind the strong post-1931
relationships seen in the pooled data. Britain, China, India, and Romania all have negative
relationships with the United States in their nonpegs of the 1930s.
When we classify the episodes by both exchange rate regime and capital control status,
we have eleven open pegs, four open nonpegs, three closed pegs, and three closed
nonpegs. Thus, there are too few country episodes to speak meaningfully about averages
across groups, but we do see some suggestive patterns. By and large, the open pegs show
a fairly strong connection with the gold interest rate. Three of the eleven show statistically
significant positive relationships with an overall average of 0.67 and an adjustment half-
life of seven months. No episodes show a negative levels relationship and only two have
adjustment half-lives above twelve months. Once again, it appears that the countries we
expect to be constrained by the trilemma show evidence of that constraint.
Alternatively, in the episodes of closed nonpegs, countries do not appear to follow the
Unites States. Two of the three show negative levels relationships. Only Britain prior to
                                                            
21 The average adjustment speeds match our simulations as well, with mean θ equal to
roughly  –0.2 for pegs and –0.1 for nonpegs. However, the average θ for post-1931
nonpegs is not very informative regarding autonomy because in most cases, countries are
adjusting interest rates away from the base.
22 The results for the pegs are slightly weaker when using the U.S. rate, dropping the
levels relationship to roughly 0.36 with an adjustment half-life of roughly five months.
The pre-1931 nonpegs are as unconnected to the U.S. rate alone as to the gold interest
rate, with a negative average levels relationship, an average adjustment half-life of over
28 months, three out of eight with negative levels relationships, two more slower than
twelve months, and only one significant positive relationship.21
its return to gold shows a strong connection at all, with an insignificant (but close to
unity) levels relationship and an adjustment half-life below six months. Britain in the
years 1921–24 was intent on returning to gold and, thus, was following the United States
quite closely; it was not trying to pursue an independent course, but it lacked credibility
and reserves sufficient to rejoin the gold standard. The pre-1925 British result supports
our contention that closed nonpegs in the post-1931 era show strong comovements with
the base rate because they were hoping to repeg. Interestingly, there are no closed
nonpegged episodes from the post-1931 era because no country in our sample maintained
a  nonpeg  and  closed  capital markets for  as  long  as  three  years  (our  criterion for
consideration as a distinct “episode”). Countries either briefly returned to pegs to break up
strings of nonpegging, or repegged within three years of leaving gold.
The results for the closed pegs are fairly close to those for open pegs, suggesting that
perhaps closing capital markets does not entirely insulate a country if it intends to
maintain a peg for a considerable length of time. None of the three levels relationships is
significant, but they are all positive, and two are quite close to 1. The adjustment half-
lives are all estimated to be between four and eight months. Our data comprise only three
examples, though, of countries that maintained closed pegs for any extended period, so it
is difficult to conclude much about them. The open nonpegs are split, with two (Britain,
1931–34 and Italy, 1922–27) showing insignificant negative levels relationships; one
(Sweden, 1931–34) showing an insignificant, slowly adjusting, positive relationship; and
one, (India, 1931–34) showing a significant positive relationship with an adjustment half-
life of one month.
23
A final point worth noting is that interest rates in France and the United States were
never that closely related. Both during France’s prepegging episode from 1922 to 1926,
and during its peg from 1928 to 1936, a negative levels relationship prevailed. Thus, one
sees part of the great tension in the system as a whole during this era: the two center
countries  with  the  bulk  of  the  gold  reserves  were  moving  their  interest  rates
independently, making it difficult for countries to follow a single base.
Summary
The two types of econometric analysis broadly support the predictions of the trilemma.
The pooled analysis shows that short-run interest rate movements in the pegged countries,
especially when they have open capital markets, follow the base interest rate. The levels
analysis shows that on average, it is the open pegs or de jure pegs that follow the base the
                                                            
23 The patterns when the U.S. interest rate is the base are similar, with the open pegs
showing similar results episode by episode, though with a slightly lower average half-life
(in particular, Austria, Hungary, and India are somewhat weaker against the U.S. interest
rate than against the gold interest rate). In other groups, Germany shows a weaker
relationship to the dollar rate as compared with the gold interest rate. Sweden’s interest
rate during its open nonpeg has a significant levels relationship with the dollar rate despite
its insignificant relationship with the gold interest rate.22
most closely over time. Notably, many nonpegs seem to show considerable independence
from the base interest rate at many points in the sample. A number of countries that are
briefly floating do combine to generate a high average response of closed nonpegs to the
base rate during the Great Depression, but this is largely an anomaly in our sample and
the result is not significant.
Thus, we see that “fear of floating” type of behavior, while present in some cases, was
not at all universal in our sample period as a whole. Many nonpeg countries were able to
move their interest rates in ways quite distinct from the base country. On the other hand,
in times of crisis, more floating rate countries may have chosen to follow the base in an
attempt to repeg, may have been forced to follow the base or risk further speculative
attack, or may simply have been following the base because of globally synchronized
responses to large common shocks.
The trilemma finds considerable empirical support in this era, and the empirics
generate results that are numerically consistent with theoretical, model-based simulations.
The trilemma was a constraint on policy for countries that fixed their exchange rate and
maintained open capital markets. They lost much of their monetary autonomy compared
with countries that adopted alternative regimes. The results also show why the architects
of Bretton Woods were so concerned to create a system that would allow for some
monetary autonomy notwithstanding stable exchange rates. The fact that some floaters did
not pursue autonomy (as they could have), and instead managed interest rates with an eye
toward returning to a peg, may have convinced contemporaries like Keynes and Nurkse
that the potential instability of floating rates was not effectively compensated by any
meaningful policy freedom. That view, in turn, led to the Bretton Woods consensus in
favor of fixed exchange rates coupled with capital account control.
V. Conclusion
Up until now, the empirical content of the trilemma and, hence, its practical relevance,
have remained largely untested. Our work seeks to show that the trilemma is a central
feature of the macroeconomic world we have lived in for a century or more. Understood
in a target-zone context, the real world content of the trilemma does deviate from the
simplistic idea of full international interest rate equalization, but only in degree. It is true
that this deviation confers a little independence on policymakers even under hard gold
standard rules (Bordo, 2003; Bordo and Flandreau, 2003; and Bordo and MacDonald,
1997, 2003). But that independence is very limited indeed, we would argue. Under open
capital markets and pegged exchange rates, the half lives of interest rate deviations can be
counted in months, and interest rate pass-through is very strong whether before or after
World War I, or even today. It is not clear that such meager room for maneuver can offer
any significant scope for purposeful macroeconomic management, especially when
compared to the far slower adjustment and lower pass-through seen in floating or closed23
capital-market countries. Only a move to floating or the imposition of capital controls can
free monetary policy to pursue domestic aims, and in practice they seem to do so.
Spanning, as it does, a century or more of experience, our empirical work in this and
other papers highlights the enduring power of this principle. In this sense, we would argue
that the trilemma is alive and well. As a working proposition, it merits attention from a
wide audience, if our work is found to be persuasive. As a narrative hook, historians and
political scientists have often invoked or criticized its applicability, but with little
empirical evidence to guide interpretation. International economists will find an old
familiar part of their toolkit now has been sharpened up by use in the field. Last, but not
least, policymakers may better comprehend the true nature of the constraints under which
they must operate in an open economy.
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(New York: Simon & Schuster).Table 1 Simulated Estimates of β and θ (Three-Month Interest Rates)
Regime
€ 










ˆ  θ 
ρ(Dz,DRb)=0.8
Target Zone (±1%) 0.50 0.13 0.83 0.83 –0.22
(0.07) (0.12) (0.07)
Float 0.16 0.02 0.61 0.52 –0.10
(0.07) (0.22) (0.05)
ρ(Dz,DRb)=0.5
Target Zone (±1%) 0.69 0.20 0.89 0.84 –0.21
(0.08) (0.12) (0.06)
Float 0.46 0.05 0.76 0.49 –0.09
(0.08) (0.26) (0.04)
ρ(Dz,DRb)=0
Target Zone (±1%) 0.99 0.33 1.00 0.86 –0.20
(0.08) (0.13) (0.06)
Float 0.97 0.27 0.98 0.67 –0.09
(0.10) (0.26) (0.04)
ρ(Dz,DRb)=–0.5
Target Zone (±1%) 1.28 0.43 1.10 0.86 –0.20
(0.10) (0.13) (0.06)
Float 1.44 0.47 1.19 0.77 –0.10
(0.17) (0.25) (0.04)Table 2 Countries in Sample
Frequency    Dates available
Austria monthly  1/1923  6/1931
Belgium monthly  5/1919  12/1938
Bulgaria monthly  1/1928  12/1938
Chile annual 1929 1936
China monthly  1/1928  12/1938
Czechoslovakia monthly  1/1926  12/1938
Denmark annual 1926 1938
France monthly  1/1922  12/1938
Germany monthly  1/1919  12/1938
Hungary monthly  7/1924  12/1938
India monthly  4/1921  12/1938
Italy monthly  1/1922  12/1938
Japan monthly  1/1919  12/1938
Netherlands monthly  1/1919  12/1938
Romania monthly  1/1929  12/1938
Sweden monthly  1/1926  12/1938
Switzerland monthly  1/1924  12/1938
United Kingdom monthly  1/1919  12/1938
United States monthly  1/1919  12/1938Table 3 Core results  (uses gold interest rate as the base interest rate)
dependent variable: DRit
1 2 3 4 5
full df pegs df nonpegs  dj pegs  dj nonpegs
β (DgoldRit) 0.300 0.567 0.128 0.720 0.072
std error (0.116)* (0.134)** (0.178) (0.144)** (0.185)
Observations 240 109 106 66 163
R-squared 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.33 0.00
Notes:
df = de facto classification, dj = de jure classification
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 4    Results for other eras
dependent variable: DRit
Gold Standard Gold Standard Post BW Post BW
pegs nonpegs pegs nonpegs
β (DbaseRit) 0.52 0.05 0.46 0.27
std error (0.04)** (0.09) (0.04)** (0.08)**
Observations 399 85 748 1103
R-squared 0.41 0.00 0.19 0.01
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 5 Splitting sample by exchange rate regime and capital controls
using de facto coding
dependent variable: DRit
1 2 3 4
peg open peg closed nonpeg open nonpeg closed
β (DgoldRit) 0.647 0.183 -0.315 0.307
std error (0.153)** (0.349) (0.277) (0.210)
Observations 79 30 40 66
R-squared 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.07
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Table 6 Pooling across pegs and nonpegs
dependent variable: DRit
1 2 3 4 5
de facto de jure de facto de facto
Gold R Gold R US R UK R bloc
β1 (DgoldRit) 0.134 0.076 0.206 0.098 0.129
std error (0.177) (0.185) (0.148) (0.145) (0.134)
β2 (peg x DgoldRit) 0.425 0.62 0.217 0.18 0.219
std error (0.174)* (0.217)* (0.135) (0.178) (0.144)
Observations 215 229 224 207 219
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.09
β1+β2 0.559 0.696 0.423 0.278 0.348
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
DF = de facto coding, DJ = de jure coding, bloc = different bases using currency bloc codingTable 7 Examining pre and post 1931 (uses de facto coding and gold interest rate as base)
dependent variable: DRit
pre-31 pre-31 pre-31 post-31 post-31 post-31 post-31
full pegs nonpegs full pegs nonpegs nonpeg clsd
β (DgoldRit) 0.292 0.576 0.122 1.146 1.218 1.304 1.353
std error (0.147) (0.144)** (0.220) (0.206)** (0.483)* (0.359)** (0.341)**
Observations 111 56 46 112 42 54 35
R-squared 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.23
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses











Denmark 1932-4, 1938Table 9.  PSS Results
Table 9a.  De Jure Pegs to Gold Interest Rate
lag chosen θ γ tstat θ sig at 0  sig at 1 half-life <3 3 to 12 >12 #obs
austria 3/25 - 9/31 1 -0.10 0.31 -3.47 1 1 6.31 0 1 0 76
belgium 10/26 - 2/35 1 -0.23 0.61 -5.14 1 1 2.71 1 0 0 101
bulgaria 4/28 - 12/31 0 -0.12 0.60 -1.64 0 0 5.37 0 1 0 44
czechoslovakia 1/29 - 12/31 5 -0.72 0.40 -2.81 0 0 0.54 1 0 0 36
germany 10/24 - 6/31 3 -0.18 -0.75 -4.48 1 1 3.51 0 1 0 81
hungary 4/25 - 7/31 0 -0.12 0.43 -4.10 1 1 5.47 0 1 0 76
india 3/27 - 8/31 1 -0.30 0.72 -3.76 1 1 1.97 1 0 0 54
italy 2/28 - 11/34 1 -0.05 1.18 -1.76 0 0 13.24 0 0 1 83
netherlands 4/25 - 8/36 2 -0.23 1.03 -3.39 1 1 2.69 1 0 0 137
romania 1/29 - 12/32 0 -0.16 0.98 -2.08 0 0 3.98 0 1 0 44
sweden 3/24 - 8/31 0 -0.26 0.53 -2.72 0 0 2.32 1 0 0 67
switzerland 1/25 - 12/36 1 -0.06 0.52 -2.31 0 0 11.20 0 1 0 144
UK 4/25 - 8/31 0 -0.15 0.40 -1.81 0 0 4.36 0 1 0 77
averages -0.21 0.53 -3.03 0.46 0.46 4.90 0.38 0.54 0.08 78.46
Notes:
lag lag chosen based on Akaike information criteria
θ the adjustment speed to shocks in the levels relationship
γ the levels relationship
tstat θ the t-stat on the adjustment speed which is used to determine the signficiance of the levels relationship
sig at 0  signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume stationary data
sig at 1 signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume non-stationary data
half-life the half-life of the shock based on the adjustment speed
#obs number of observations for the episodeTable 9b.  De Jure Pre 1931 nonpegs
lag chosen θ γ tstat θ sig at 0  sig at 1 half-life <3 3 to 12 >12 #obs
belgium pre- 10/26 0 -0.02 0.17 -0.68 0 0 29.79 0 0 1 88
china pre 31 0 -0.16 0.79 -1.20 0 0 3.95 0 1 0 35
india up to 2/27 1 -0.24 -0.54 -3.86 1 1 2.49 1 0 0 69
italy up to 1/28 1 -0.03 -1.78 -1.50 0 0 25.32 0 0 1 70
japan up to 12/29 0 -0.01 0.20 -0.28 0 0 138.28 0 0 1 131
netherlands up to 3/25 1 -0.41 0.13 -5.05 1 1 1.32 1 0 0 73
switzerland up to 12/24 0 -0.03 0.29 -2.07 0 0 22.01 0 0 1 71
UK up to 3/25 0 -0.08 0.58 -1.33 0 0 8.77 0 1 0 74
averages -0.12 -0.02 -2.00 0.25 0.25 28.99 0.25 0.25 0.50 76.38
Notes:
lag lag chosen based on Akaike information criteria
θ the adjustment speed to shocks in the levels relationship
γ the levels relationship
tstat θ the t-stat on the adjustment speed which is used to determine the signficiance of the levels relationship
sig at 0  signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume stationary data
sig at 1 signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume non-stationary data
half-life the half-life of the shock based on the adjustment speed
#obs number of observations for the episodeTable 9c.  De Jure Post 1930 Nonpegs
lag chosen θ γ tstat θ sig at 0  sig at 1 half-life <3 3 to 12 >12 #obs
bulgaria post 12/31 0 -0.03 0.53 -2.14 0 0 22.76 0 0 1 84
china post 12/30 0 -0.16 -0.14 -2.77 0 0 4.03 0 1 0 96
czechoslovakia post 12/31 8 -0.08 -0.25 -3.50 1 1 8.65 0 1 0 84
germany post 6/31 1 -0.07 -2.45 -1.59 0 0 9.14 0 1 0 90
hungary post 7/31 6 -0.08 -0.27 -2.93 1 0 8.42 0 1 0 89
india post 8/31 6 -0.36 -0.04 -2.87 1 0 1.53 1 0 0 88
italy post 11/34 1 -0.19 0.42 -3.56 1 1 3.39 0 1 0 49
japan post 11/31 3 -0.09 0.16 -4.30 1 1 7.71 0 1 0 85
romania post 12/32 0 -0.09 -1.54 -2.60 0 0 7.26 0 1 0 72
sweden post 8/31 2 -0.06 -0.44 -1.84 0 0 11.81 0 1 0 88
UK post8/31 2 -0.10 -0.62 -4.00 1 1 6.58 0 1 0 88
averages 2.64 -0.12 -0.42 -2.92 0.55 0.36 8.30 0.09 0.82 0.09 83.00
Notes:
lag lag chosen based on Akaike information criteria
θ the adjustment speed to shocks in the levels relationship
γ the levels relationship
tstat θ the t-stat on the adjustment speed which is used to determine the signficiance of the levels relationship
sig at 0  signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume stationary data
sig at 1 signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume non-stationary data
half-life the half-life of the shock based on the adjustment speed
#obs number of observations for the episodeTable 9d.  De Facto Open Capital Market Pegs
lag chosen θ γ tstat θ sig at 0  sig at 1 half-life <3 3 to 12 >12 #obs
Austria 1/24 - 9/31 5 -0.03 1.15 -1.36 0 0 20.04 0 0 1 90
Belgium 8/27 - 2/33 0 -0.12 0.57 -2.00 0 0 5.33 0 1 0 67
Czech 2/27 - 9/31 1 -0.14 0.10 -1.46 0 0 4.70 0 1 0 56
France 8/28 - 9/36 0 -0.06 0.47 -1.79 0 0 11.40 0 1 0 98
Germany 11/25 - 6/31 0 -0.21 0.15 -3.89 1 1 2.88 1 0 0 68
Hungary 11/26 - 6/31 6 -0.38 0.87 -3.45 1 1 1.45 1 0 0 56
India 12/25 - 8/31 2 -0.34 0.89 -4.51 1 1 1.68 1 0 0 69
Italy 12/28 - 3/34 1 -0.05 1.50 -1.24 0 0 12.98 0 0 1 64
Netherlands 10/25 - 9/36 2 -0.22 1.00 -3.21 1 0 2.82 1 0 0 132
Sweden 1/26 - 8/31 0 -0.26 0.53 -2.72 0 0 2.32 1 0 0 67
Switzerland 8/25 - 8/36 1 -0.05 0.44 -1.85 0 0 14.09 0 0 1 134
United Kingdom 1/26 - 8/31 0 -0.12 0.16 -1.37 0 0 5.52 0 1 0 68
Switzerland (orig) 8/25 - 9/36 3 -0.06 0.14 -2.25 0 0 10.65 0 1 0 134
averages 1.64 -0.17 0.67 -2.46 0.36 0.27 6.71 0.45 0.27 0.27 79.18
Notes:
lag lag chosen based on Akaike information criteria
θ the adjustment speed to shocks in the levels relationship
γ the levels relationship
tstat θ the t-stat on the adjustment speed which is used to determine the signficiance of the levels relationship
sig at 0  signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume stationary data
sig at 1 signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume non-stationary data
half-life the half-life of the shock based on the adjustment speed
#obs number of observations for the episodeTable 9e.  De Facto other regimes
lag chosen θ γ tstat θ sig at 0  sig at 1 half-life <3 3 to 12 >12 #obs
closed nonpegs
Belgium 1/20 - 7/26 6 0.03 -1.27 0.43 0 0 -27.00 1 0 0 79
Japan 12/23 - 4/27 5 0.07 -4.01 1.01 0 0 -10.24 1 0 0 41
United Kingdom 1/20 - 11/24 0 -0.12 0.92 -1.86 0 0 5.47 0 1 0 59
closed pegs
Bulgaria 1/28 - 3/33 0 -0.10 0.90 -1.84 0 0 6.38 0 1 0 62
Germany 8/34 - 12/38 7 -0.08 0.36 -2.33 0 0 7.90 0 1 0 53
Romania 6/29 - 3/33 0 -0.16 0.91 -2.14 0 0 4.03 0 1 0 46
open nonpegs
India 9/31 - 11/34 3 -0.49 0.62 -3.57 1 1 1.03 1 0 0 39
Italy 1/22 - 11/27 1 -0.03 -1.86 -1.47 0 0 24.41 0 0 1 69
Sweden 9/31 - 11/34 0 -0.07 0.47 -0.76 0 0 10.15 0 1 0 39
United Kingdom 9/31 - 11/34 2 -0.09 -1.20 -1.21 0 0 7.62 0 1 0 39
Notes:
lag lag chosen based on Akaike information criteria
θ the adjustment speed to shocks in the levels relationship
γ the levels relationship
tstat θ the t-stat on the adjustment speed which is used to determine the signficiance of the levels relationship
sig at 0  signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume stationary data
sig at 1 signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume non-stationary data
half-life the half-life of the shock based on the adjustment speed
#obs number of observations for the episodeTable 9f.  French episodes with the US as a base interest rate
lag chosen θ γ tstat θ sig at 0  sig at 1 half-life <3 3 to 12 >12 #obs
open peg / de jure peg
France 8/28 - 9/36  7 -0.06 -0.41 -1.02 0 0 11.40 0 1 0 98
closed nonpeg
France 1/22 - 11/26 0 -0.08 -1.28 -1.41 0 0 8.42 0 1 0 58
Notes:
lag lag chosen based on Akaike information criteria
θ the adjustment speed to shocks in the levels relationship
γ the levels relationship
tstat θ the t-stat on the adjustment speed which is used to determine the signficiance of the levels relationship
sig at 0  signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume stationary data
sig at 1 signifies whether we can reject no levels relationship if we assume non-stationary data
half-life the half-life of the shock based on the adjustment speed
#obs number of observations for the episodeFigure 1a - United States' Interest Rate in the Interwar Years
Source: Global Financial Database
Figure 1b - French Interest Rate in the Interwar Years






































































































































































































































































8Figure 1c - "Gold Interest Rate" in the Interwar Years
Source: Global Financial Database and author's calculations (described in text)
Figure 1d - United Kingdom Interest Rate in the Classical Gold Standard




































































































































UK interest rate in the Gold Standard
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